Website news and updates:


26th April 2017 - Resupply convoy photo album updated

21st April 2017 - ‘Report Precise’ page added

21st April 2017 - ‘British War Crimes’ Report awaiting update

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Introduction

In the summer of 2012 I deployed to Helmand, Afghanistan with an organization that claimed to be the best - a self attributed accolade of the army you can still see on their recruitment banners today:


The reality I witnessed over the next six months was an institution that seemed to have only one mission in mind – the justification and consumption of bloated military budgets. And in that role of budget consumption the army and wider ministry of defence performed magnificently, to the tune of over £37 billion according to one of the best informed and most candid former army officers I know to have spoken on the subject:    


But it is not only critics of the campaign who are speaking out: even the ministry of defence described the British military command in Afghanistan as:

arrogant, needy and slow

The British Ambassador to Kabul described our military command there as suffering: 

"a massive act of collective self-deception"

And a parliamentary defence select committee review of actions in Helmand described the ministry of defence as being:

obstructive and unhelpful to us as we tried to establish the facts

But perhaps the most damning and accurate indictment comes from the Mother whose only son, a US Marine Lieutenant Colonel, was killed because of our criminal incompetence: 

Dodging blame is the only concern of UK military leaders


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My Intended Actions

So what can I, a lowly territorial army vehicle mechanic add to this dissection of military failures? With my first hand experiences, wider knowledge and indesputable evidence i can show:

  • that the failures were institutional and endemic – from the most senior officer, the Chief of the General Staff, right down to a reserve mechanic level.


  • how the senior military command is directly and absolutely responsible for each and every one of these failings, and has done everything in its power to avoid any sense of accountability for its failings.


  • how these failings manifested themselves in incompetence, corruption, criminality, duplicity and deceit by the most senior British officers.    


My parting thought as i left Camp Bastion for the last time was that i had been party to a criminal enterprise.
It was one designed to justify bloated and unfathomable military budgets, regardless of the mission aims or the cost in blood, misery and suffering - be that NATO, Afghan or civilian. 

My intention here is to expose that reality and seek genuine accountability of the most senior command - military and political.


Reports
 

War crimes 1 copy


British Army War Crimes

Formal Orders to Use
White Phosphorus Offensively Against Afghan Children



Opium one Copy


Opium Harvesting, April 2012

Protected by British Forces,
200 Metres from Camp Bastion's
Perimeter Fence



Prince Harry


Camp Bastion Attack, Sept 2012

Perpetrated by Taliban Forces,
Less than 200 Metres from a
British Guard Tower
 





Key to Report Text
Underlined Red Text - External Link, Opens in New Tab

Underlined Blue Text - Internal Link, Opens in Same Tab



© Anthony C Heaford 2016