NATO's Human Shield

Human Shields

I was a top-cover machine gunner for the recovery mechanics' vehicle on five Combat Logistic Patrols (CLPs) in Helmand and I loved it - the highlight of my very brief military career. The constant threat from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), snipers and ambushes is why I took so many photos: I was collecting Intel and evaluating those threats. The two photos below were taken at the same spot where a tractor had suspiciously shed its load in our path and locals were watching from an adjacent camel track. With all those orange bags it was potentially a massive IED but the 'atmospherics' told us it was safe - the willing presence of civilians so close to the orange bags strongly suggested it wasn't an IED. It was probably still the Taliban though (the guy sitting crossed legged in the righthand photo), testing our reactions and watching our TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures).

My photos below (taken during Operation Mubaraz on 6 July 2012) show civilians standing close to another potential IED emplacement, inside the barbed wire covered culvert. Only this time they were not standing there willingly - they were our Civilian Human Shield. We were returning to Camp Bastion on the last leg of a twelve hour patrol, the last vehicle in our section and so I was covering the rear. I took a lot of photos of culverts that summer because that's where the IEDs were - I was Intel gathering and trying to distract myself from thoughts of having my legs blown off at any moment. It was a hostile environment and so when I saw half a dozen locals stood next to one of the culverts I quickly crouched down to ask the driver: "What the **** are they doing there?" He told me not to worry about it and I managed to get back up in time to take their photo.

My first question to the driver and vehicle commander when we got back was, again: "What the **** were they doing there?", referring to the Afghans by the culvert. That's when they told me we'd been the last vehicle to pass over an IED in a culvert before it had exploded. It must have been some distance behind us because I didn't see or hear it but it was big enough to close the road. They said that because of that near miss our commanders radioed our Afghan allies to ask them to check the culverts in front of us for IEDs. The Afghan army's method of checking for IEDs was to get civilians to stand on or by them and in this instance they'd taken passengers off passing vehicles - the men in the photo - and made them stand there until our convoy had passed by safely.

The use of a civilian Human Shield is clearly a War Crime, but responsibility is difficult to attribute. The British commander didn't stop their use as a Human Shield but he did get a very difficult job done without a single death or injury. I struggle to blame the Afghan security forces either - why would they risk their lives for Brits driving past in their expensive armoured vehicles? Corruption was so bad in the Afghan army that in Helmand they were 40% undermanned but the commanders were still collecting the missing soldiers wages. They were short of kit and often went unpaid too, again due to the corruption of the men NATO put in charge. If we want to stop NATO forces using civilians as human shields then that's the Generals and Government Ministers responsibility. If they put us in such shitty situations then when it goes wrong they should be held to account and then maybe they'll step up to the mark with regards to the right mission selection, being trained well, and having the right kit. If they negligently place ill equipped and poorly trained soldiers in harms way again, as happened all over Helmand, then they should be held fully accountable for the consequences.

Getting Stoned

Before my first top-cover duty in Helmand on 21 June 2012 I was told by my own commanders (of the Light Vehicles platoon, not the recovery mechanics) to take a bag of stones to throw at kids. My initial reaction was disbelief, asking if they were serious. They explained the problem - kids stealing items off vehicles - and said it was the best solution they'd found (in the 300+ years of the British army's existence). When I got to the vehicle the cupola was already loaded with a bag of about a hundred stones - jagged gravel pieces about an inch across. I wasn't happy but I accepted the reality and the experience of the regular soldiers I was serving with (I was an army reserve on my first and only operational tour). And we were tested on the return journey from FOB Shawqat in the heart of Nadi Ali. The kids must have predicted our return route because they were already waiting for us on the track besides the canal. There were three groups - each comprising two adolescent stone throwers, an older overseer and a younger lookout, girls stood a little away and wearing red dresses. Those appeared to be the children's (stone throwing thieves) TTPs - Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. While British soldiers only did six month tours these children had known nothing but war their whole lives and that's why I took the matter so seriously. It'd be very easy for a stone they were throwing to be replaced by a hand grenade, or instead of stealing off our trucks they could be planting a magnetic IED - the potential threat was very real.

We were second to last in the convoy and I was covering the rear vehicle when I saw two motorbikes approaching with riders and pillions in local dress. I thought I saw the barrel of a Kalashnikov rifle too. I took a firm hold of the machine gun's pistol grip and checked my target - they were approaching very fast and I was pretty sure they were armed. I prepared myself mentally to fire then ducked down to tell the driver / commander of my intention. I got a wide eyed "No! They're Afghan Local Police" in reply and my heart skipped a beat in relief. I stood back up, took the photo then watched them skidding to a halt besides our vehicle, both men dismounting at speed to chase the kids away.

Afghan Local Police coming to stop the first group of stone throwers.

The next group were on the farside of the canal meaning they couldn't steal anything but were still stoning us and they were good shots. With no danger of them approaching or damaging the vehicle I reached for my camera again and made an amazing discovery - the moment they saw my camera they dropped their stones and started walking away. I'd breached the stone throwing thieves TTPs and found their vulnerability - a fear of being identified by the ALP from my photos.

I couldn't have been happier with the result and my driver/commander were very impressed too - I'd discovered a really simple and effective tactic on my first top-cover patrol. I couldn't wait to get back to my platoon to tell them but I was sadly disappointed. They looked at my photos - proof positive - and said "Nah, we'll keep stoning them". I tried to reason with them and when challenged I said I wouldn't stone kids if I had a better tactic. That's when my problems started. It appears stoning children was an initiation right in my platoon - if you wouldn't stone kids you weren't in their club, and that's serious because those were the guys I was hoping would watch my back. The repercussions became so serious I feared for my wellbeing. A junior officer took the afternoon parade one day and told the platoon I was endangering soldiers lives by refusing to stone children and that the platoon should exact their own justice. I went straight to the recovery mechanics platoon across the way and asked them if I'd endangered their lives. They assured me I hadn't and that's why they kept asking me back - they liked my tactics because they worked. They spoke up for me and that countered some of the backlash but I was still a marked man within my own platoon.

I admit my camera tactic wasn’t 100% successful – I was hit square between the eyes by a stone thrown perfectly from about 100-feet away. I was knocked off my perch but thankfully had my ballistic goggles on so wasn’t injured. I stretched my arm up an gave the two young boys a thumbs up for a good shot and my driver told me they bent double with laughter. In another more serious incident a gang of kids stole our battery cover and when the driver opened his door to try to stop them a stone to the face gave him a bloody nose. But still the recovery mechanics kept asking me back so I must have done something right. My tactic wasn’t perfect but it was better than throwing stones and fitted within the mission statement we’d been given:

"Operate in Accordance with The Law
Live our values. Stay true to the values we hold dear. This is what distinguishes you from our enemies. Do not break the law.
Do not retaliate.

Know your Rules of Engagement
Do not abuse the powers you have and the force you have on call. You will undermine our position if you do. Do not accept it if others act illegally or cross the line."

*The document is marked restricted but this image has already been published by the House of Lords Commissioner for Standards in 2017 when investigating The Conduct of Baron David Richards, a former British army General and Chief of the Defence Staff during my 2012 Afghan tour - these war crimes happened under Richards' command as did summary executions of Afghan prisoners-of-war.

Illegal Escalation of Force Orders Against Children

British army tactics to stop Afghan children harrassing our vehicle patrols did not work - that's why the kids were still stoning and robbing us in 2012. During one of the five patrol briefings I attended we were told if stones didn't scare the kids we should fire mini-flares (incendiary munitions) so they 'bounce off the floor next to them' , and if that didn't work to threaten them - children - with loaded pistols. The offensive use of incendiary munitions is a War Crime and although I only heard that order once and never saw it carried out, I have heard two confirmable reports of British mini-flares being fired as warning shots towards Afghan civilians. One was fired towards an Afghan male walking with a wheelbarrow towards some British soldiers, the other was at a civilian vehicle that got too close to a British military vehicle. The videos below show the inaccuracy of mini-flares and an American Special Forces soldier describing the horrific injuries one child suffered after being hit in his stomach by a mini-flare. The Americans were keeping him alive in their medical facility but the wound wasn't healing and discharging him to local care would have been a death sentence because of infection. The American said the flare had been fired because the boy, Muhammad, had been playing football in the street; he says the flare fired by a NATO ally hit a tree and 'bounced' down into the eight year old's stomach. I don't know what happened to Muhammad after that, whether he survived or not.

My Suggested TTPs for Civilian / Children’s Hostility to Vehicle Convoys
No sweets / pens / water / any gifts to kids.
ALL engagement through an elder, preferably before patrols, with gifts and instructions to stay away from military kit and personnel.
If engagement is not possible before then it should be carried out by the convoy’s vanguard.
Unless in urgent need, always send children away to get an adult before engaging further.
If hostilities linger just drive through in a cloud of tear gas.
Correct kit – protective and offensive equipment.

My Suggested Escalation of Force Against Hostile Children
Photograph suspects so they know they’ve been identified
Visual / Vocal Warnings
Irritant sprays (like bear spray cans)
Paintball guns (to deter/mark offenders & blind windows of encroaching vehicles)
Tear gas canisters (with smoke hoods for soldiers to put on without taking their helmet off)
Paintball gun with solid pellets (or a shotgun)
Lethal Force

Work-in-Progress...

Reporting Efforts & Consequences