Britain's Third Opium War
by Anthony C Heaford --- @mancunianquiet on twitter --- Work-in-Progress
Part One: British Complicity in Afghan Opium Production
Part Two: Was British Complicity in Opium Production a Tactic or Strategy?
Part Three: The Consequence of British Complicity in Afghan Opium Production
Part 4: The Cover-Up - Pending
Part One: British Complicity in Afghan Opium Production
This was my view on my first operational guard duty for the British army, in April 2012 Afghanistan. I wasn’t just watching opium harvesting and processing right by Britain's main operating base Camp Bastion, we were protecting the class A drug production from interference by the Afghan security forces, and irrigating the poppy fields with NATO's treated effluent too! This complicity in opium production continued till Britain left Helmand in 2014, after which the poppy production by Bastion reduced noticably, as per the analyzed satellite image below.
During our guard tower briefing that day we were told the Afghan security forces (ANDSF) were harassing the farmers living by the airfield. If we saw any ANDSF even enter the valley on Camp Bastion’s eastern perimeter our orders were to radio for the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to intervene. The RAF Regiment Sergeant didn't mention the poppy field or opium processing during the briefing but I did ask him about it when he next visited the tower; sounding embarrassed he said “Yeah, I know”. My battalion second-in-command (a Major) also visited the tower and after repeating the tower briefing to him I tried to point out the opium harvesting. His reaction was to laugh nervously before saying “I can’t see anything” as he quickly climbed down the ladder. I guess his concern about acknowledging the drug production by Bastion was because he knew at that same moment 170 British soldiers were on Operation Shafuq, a poppy eradication mission with the ANDSF ten miles away in the Taliban’s heartland near Nadi Ali.
Guard tower 11 on
Camp Bastion's airfield
Operation Shafuq - British Military Duplicity,
protecting some poppy fields and destroying others
Britain favoured one drug trafficking clan over another
On 17 December 2013, when giving evidence to a British parliament inquiry into the Taliban's 14/15 September 2012 attack on Camp Bastion's airfield, British Lieutenant General David Capewell told the defence committee members:
"I think it was a minor tactical error to allow that poppy field to grow...
It was a minor contributing factor to the enemy's success."
- and thereby admitting that for NATO's British commanders, allowing some opium production was permissible, on a tactical level. It also confirms Britain's 'tactical criminality' assisted the Taliban in planning their attack that killed two US Marines and caused $400-million of damage. But was this complicity in opium production really isolated tactical pragmatism, or was it Britain's secret strategic policy to favour one drug trafficking clan over another?
Part Two: Was British Complicity in Opium Production a Tactic or Strategy?
There’s no doubting Britain’s public stance on poppy eradication because we were the lead nation on counter narcotics from 2002. And in 2004 Britain, the UNODC and the Afghan Government co-hosted the International Counter Narcotics Conference on Afghanistan. Clandestine MI6 actions also show Britain was committed to poppy eradication; they instructed our ambassador in Kabul Rosalind Marsden (as per the red underlined text pictured right) to sack Helmand’s governor Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (SMA) for his alleged role in Helmand’s opium trade. Marsden visited SMA briefly in May 2005 and then started issuing demands he be sacked but met with stiff resistance for a few reasons. First, SMA was the most powerful war lord in Helmand. Second, SMA was President Karzai’s brother-in-law and third, he had kept the Taliban out of Helmand since 2002. But MI6 were determined and pulled enough strings to ensure SMA was gone by December 2005, before the main British army deployment to Helmand in 2006. Many of his now unemployed militia - about 3000-men – are said to have joined the Taliban.
SMA didn’t need his militia anymore because his brother-in-law President Karzai made him a senator in Kabul. I consider that 2005 sacking of SMA as the moment NATO’s battle for Helmand was doomed and effectively lost. My assertion gains traction when you read this 2009 parliamentary debate quote by Paul Flynn, a thirty-two year member of parliament:
"Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, who led 16 Air Assault Brigade in Helmand, before the real trouble began said:
“There is not to my mind an insurgency in Helmand. But we can create one if we want to.”
It was a peaceful area, and we created the insurgency by our presence there in 2006. Ministers sleepwalked into the hornets’ nest of Helmand and changed what was a manageable situation in Afghanistan into one that is now unwinnable."
That was the message that came back with the SAS’s 2004 Helmand reconnaissance team, as quoted again in a 2015 parliamentary debate by Adam Holloway MP, a Special Forces veteran of Iraq himself:
"Indeed, one of my friends was on the recce in 2004 before we went into Helmand. When he got back to England, he went to see a very senior guy at Permanent Joint Headquarters. That very senior general asked him,
“So, what’s the insurgency like in Helmand?”
My friend replied, “Well, there isn’t one, but I can give you one if you want one.”
What's clear is there wasn't an insurgency in Helmand in 2004 but British Special forces did say they could start one. Then in May 2005 ambassador Marsden's MI6 backed mission to sack SMA began, resulting in the 3000 unemployed militia hitting the streets of Helmand a month or two before the British arrived in force. I can't think of a better way to have started an insurgency than by sacking SMA - was that MI6's real intention? The only beneficiaries would be the Profiteers, Colonialists and Drug Traffickers, so it is not beyond the realms of possibility that that was MI6's plan all along - create chaos under the cover of poppy eradication policy and then offer an expensive solution (it cost $7-billion, mostly to private contractors). But that still leaves the question of why British soldiers were irrigating and protecting the poppies by Camp Bastion in 2012. Based on my extensive research I think I have the answer:
Camp Bastion was in Washir district of Helmand province whose governor in 2012 was Mohammed Daoud Noorzai (MDN, pictured right) with who the British had a very good relationship. He controlled the land Camp Bastion was built on and the land the poppies were grown on. MDN was so important to the British that he got regular mentions in our guard tower briefings – when ever I raised a concern that summer about airfield security I was repeatedly told “Don’t worry, Mohammed Daoud controls this valley”. Our guard commanders were so disinterested in my concerns it felt as though responsibility for our airfield’s security had been passed to MDN. That blind trust cost our US Marine Corp allies dearly on 14/15 September 2012 when fifteen Taliban suicide attackers breached our airfield defences from that same valley where the poppies grew. American Major General Sturdevant told the US inquiry into the attack that:
"We literally had poppy growing right up against the perimeter fence. That was another thing that Maj. Gen. Gurganus tried to take action on, but he wasn't able to accomplish that. It was because the Afghans had to do it. We weren't allowed to. The biggest external threat to the base came from there… "
But British Lieutenant General David Capewell contradicted Major General Gurganus when he described allowing the poppy to grow there as a minor tactical error. The question of whether that policy was isolated tactical pragmatism is answered by the charts below that show two things. While Britain’s main operating base was located in Washir district poppy production increased ten fold, and in the same period there appear to have been little to no poppy eradication missions there either. Added to the fact the Noorzai clan of Helmand (that I assume Mohammed Daoud Noorzai is a member of) was highlighted in British army manuals for its major role in the international opium trade, then it appears that Britain really did favour one drug trafficking clan over another, the Noorzais over SMA’s Akhundzadas in this case. Therefore Britain’s complicity in opium production can accurately be described as MI6’s clandestine strategic policy - not so concerned about stopping opium production, just who controlled it.
Foot note: In 2005 US authorities arrested Afghan opium kingpin / occasional CIA asset Bashir Noorzai in a treacherous sting operation, jailing him for life on drug smuggling charges. I don’t know if Bashir Noorzai is related to Mohammed Daoud Noorzai, but it’d raise some fascinating questions if he is.
This UNODC map shows that despite being in an eradication zone there were no governor led poppy eradication missions in Washir district in 2012.
This UNODC chart shows opium production in Washir district increased ten fold while Camp Bastion was there and in British hands.
Part Three: The Consequence of British Complicity in Afghan Opium Production
Tactical: From a soldier’s point of view the principle consequence of our complicity in opium production by Camp Bastion was that Taliban allies posing as migrant labourers could spend weeks living just two hundred metres from our base’s perimeter fence, mapping the airfield, noting aircraft movements, guard patterns and the like. That’s confirmed by the British and American generals I’ve quoted above who admit it contributed to the success of the Taliban’s September 2012 airfield raid (that was originally planned for July). Therefore on a tactical level the main cost of Britain’s criminality was borne by the US Marine Corp. They suffered two Marines killed in action while defending the airfield, an entire squadron of their Harrier Jump Jets decimated by Taliban grenades, and a total of $400-million in damage and costs.
Strategic: The Taliban has effectively eradicated opium production in Afghanistan twice, first in 2000 and again in 2022, both times at very little cost and done within a growing season or two. NATO spent twenty years and about $7-Billion on the same project but achieved nothing other than presiding over record levels of opium production – fuelling over 80% of the world’s heroin supply. Strategically NATO made fools of ourselves, for twenty years, our stated mission in tatters. But if the strategy had been to keep the heroin trade and private military contractors busy, it couldn’t have been more successful. Was that MI6's plan when they sacked SMA? Having protected the opium harvest and processing for the British army in 2012 Helmand myself, it wouldn’t surprise me.
Political: I know of no political or military consequences or accountability for our complicity in Afghan opium production. The British officers who allowed it got medals, tea with the queen and promotions, as did the British officers who allowed it to continue after the Taliban’s 2012 airfield raid. Members of parliament and government ministers refuse to pursue the matter and move on to executive jobs with the war profiteers. Military and civilian police have proved utterly corrupt, refusing to accept the incontrovertible evidence.
Part Four: The Cover-up


Work-in-Progress