Foxhound Corruption

£400+Million of British Procurement Corruption That Cost America Dearly
by Anthony C Heaford --- @mancunianquiet on twitter --- Work-in-Progress

On 11 September 2012 British defence secretary Philip Hammond stood in a guard tower on Camp Bastion’s eastern perimeter to watch the new £1,000,000-each Foxhound vehicle conduct a staged patrol on the public road running parallel to the base’s airfield. Three days later, on the night of 14/15 September, fifteen heavily armed Taliban launched their airfield raid from that public road, breached the defences and walked between our guard towers undetected. Over the next four hours those attackers killed two US Marines, wounded sixteen other NATO personnel, decimated an entire squadron of US Harrier Jump Jets and caused a total of $400-million of damaged before being stopped. They went undetected initially for one principal reason – the guard towers nearest the breach point did not have any night vision equipment because the British army couldn’t afford them. Instead, the British command chose to splurge £400-million on the Foxhound desert patrol vehicles that they already knew broke down in hot weather – it was non-taskworthy in British army parlance.

I know the history of this Foxhound corruption because I deployed to 2012 Helmand with 4 Battalion REME (Royal Electrical & Mechanical Engineers) and was assigned to the Light Vehicles Platoon who were responsible for the in-theatre hot weather trials. I know the vehicle patrol that Hammond watched was faked because the REME recovery mechanics I did five top-cover duties for told me so. Hours before Hammond arrived to watch the patrol pass by, two 32-metric ton recovery vehicles had been placed strategically along the Foxhound’s route, but out of sight of the guard tower Hammond was in. The Foxhound was so unreliable that it needed that precaution even though it was within proverbial spitting distance of our main operating base. After the faked patrol the Foxhound was signed into service and defense secretary Hammond reported back to parliament how wonderful it was and extended the procurement to four-hundred total. It’s impossible not to link that gross deception to the success of the Taliban’s subsequent airfield raid due to its proximity in time and space to the attacker’s breach point and the insanity of wasting £400-million on a non-taskworthy vehicle whilst we couldn’t afford to give the soldiers guarding the base the most basic and essential kit – night vision equipment. And the fact we could secure the perimeter enough for a government minister to visit while we staged a sophisticated deception in that valley on the 11 September, but couldn’t stop fifteen heavily armed Taliban being dropped off in exactly the same place three days later beggars belief. As well as the two US Marines killed in that attack, I can attribute the British command’s corruption and incompetence to the unnecessary deaths of British soldiers too.

4Bn REME Light Vehicles Platoon in 2012 Camp Bastion, me (back row) & two civilian Foxhound contractors circled

Foxhound Failing Hot Weather Trials in Kenya & Afghanistan

When I returned to the Light Vehicle’s Platoon workshop after my 25 May 2012 airfield guard tower duty, where I’d photographed the Foxhound being accompanied on its hot weather trials by a soft-skinned Land Rover, everyone was talking about the trial. After attempting to drive off-road the Foxhound engine had over heated causing the vehicle to breakdown. It took an hour to cool down enough for it to become operational again. When I spoke with a Corporal about it he told me that when a power hungry suspension-compressor and Electronic Counter Measures system (to protect against IEDs) were operating, combined with the ambient desert temperatures and off-road driving demands, the engine was not powerful enough and overheated. He pointed to the massive array of venting holes on the engine compartment and said it was not enough but if they added any more it wouldn’t be strong enough to support the bonnet (which alone cost £10,000). He joked that if they switched the air conditioning it might work. He said it wasn't possible to upgrade the engine, explaining the whole drive system would have to be replaced too. He told me it was an inherent design fault - the Foxhound's engine was designed for speed boats. That detail is confirmed in the 2017 'Trucking Useless' news report.

One Foxhound vehicle remained in a corner of our workshop till September, but no work was done on it and the two civilian Foxhound technicians attached to our unit kept a very low profile for the entire tour. By September I had a reputation in the platoon for speaking my mind due to my repeated refusal to stone Afghan children who stoned our vehicles when I acted as top cover for the recovery mechanics on five patrols. The recovery mechanics had seen my alternative tactics work (taking the stone throwers photo stopped them immediately) and happy with that, they kept asking for me to accompany them, but the Light Vehicle’s platoon commanders still accused me of endangering British lives by refusing to stone children. And so, on the morning of Philip Hammond’s visit, when he watched the fake Foxhound patrol and visited our workshop, a junior officer told me not to mention the Foxhound’s overheating problem to him. I asked if he was ordering me to lie to a government minister and he said “Yes”. He returned five minutes later and sent me to another workshop for the rest of the day to ensure I didn’t cross paths with Hammond. Having spent years working as a civilian field service technician I was very aware of commissioning problems and assuming the Foxhound’s faults would eventually be rectified, I didn’t report the matter or take any further action – I was only a mechanic after all. That was until I saw the 2017 news report calling the Foxhound ‘Trucking Useless!’ that is.

Realising that British profiteers – the Military Industrial Complex - were still putting British soldier’s lives at risk, in December 2017 I published my original report on the Foxhound corruption I was aware of from 2012 Helmand. This updated report has several purposes: to clarify and confirm details in my original report, for submission to my member of parliament Connor Rand in the hope that the new Labour government will address this procurement corruption, and to highlight a remarkable detail that has come to my attention since. In March 2018 I was appointed a US Pentagon liaison by the US 9/11 Military Commission at Guantanamo; that relates to my meetings with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and members of his terrorist cell near Al Qaidah town in 1997 Yemen. That liaison, Amy Zittritsch, was a Defense Information Security Officer contracted to the Pentagon by her employer CSRA – a subsidiary of General Dynamics, whose £400-million Foxhound corruption I had reported on just a few months before. I concede that may be just a bizarre coincidence, but even if it is, it illustrates clearly the extent of the Military Industrial Complex's reach.

British defence secretary Philip Hammond being briefed about the Foxhound in 2012 Camp Bastion

My 2018 email from a US Pentagon contractor investigating 9/11 but also employed by a subsiduary of the Foxhound manufacturer, General Dynamics' company CSRA

The Foxhound Urgent Operational Requirement

The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) order for a suitable light protected patrol vehicle (LPPV) that should’ve been issued on the 29 January 2004, the day after Private Jonathan Kitulagoda’s death, was eventually issued on 30 November 2010. But hinting at the procurement corruption already underway, instead of ordering a tried and tested vehicle available immediately for purchase, the Ministry of Defence ordered the prototype Foxhound (then called the Ocelot) from Force Protection Europe (FPE) Limited. And despite being pitched as an UOR, the selection process had begun in September 2009 with three British built contenders: the prototype Zephyr LPPV, a design concept SPV400, and the prototype Ocelot / Foxhound.

Procurement Corruption? What is most interesting is that on 11 November 2010, just 19-days before the Foxhound purchase was announced, FPE met with British spook Sir Richard Paniguian (Source: FOIA .pdf thanks to unredacted.uk). Paniguian worked for British Petroleum (BP) and was active in Iran during their 1979 Revolution, was pitching for BP oil contracts in post 2003 Iraq, and was deeply involved in arms sales to Libya in return for BP oil contracts. In 2008 he took one of the highest paid jobs in British government, working for the Trade and Investment (T&I) department, essentially giving away free money to select businesses and under which guise he met with the FPE representatives on 11 November 2010. Paniguian’s boss at T&I was the department’s CEO, Sir Andrew Cahn. FPE was purchased by General Dynamics in 2011 and on 23 May 2012 Cahn was appointed as a non-executive director of General Dynamics UK. Questions arising from that highly suspect activity are: did T&I ever make any payments to FPE or their associated companies? Was this revolving door of employment between a government minister and General Dynamics in any way related to FPE being awarded the UOR order? The November 2010 order was for two-hundred vehicles, but before it had even completed its hot weather trials (that both the British army and General Dynamics already knew it had failed), a further order for one hundred more vehicles was confirmed by the government on 17 June 2012. After the faked patrol that Hammond watched on 11 September, and ignoring the fact the Foxhound had failed its hot weather trials, the procurement continued until the fleet numbered four hundred total.

The November 2010 UOR procurement notice highlighted a few features of the new vehicle, including: claiming it could operate in extreme temperatures (it couldn’t then and still can’t today). Saying it used Formula 1 racing technology devised by engineers from the World Rally Championship, McLaren F1 and BMW (what do they know about combat vehicles?). Saying “A lot of hard work has been put into making sure this vehicle is delivered to the front line as quickly as possible” (it took nearly two years to be delivered and finally signed in to service in September 2012, despite it still being non-taskworthy). Boasting about its V-shaped hull design which is a concept as old as LPPVs (as illustrated by the very similar ‘Hotlips’ vehicle pictured above, from the 1960s Rhodesian Bush War). Claiming it could continue driving on three wheels after a land mine / IED strike (therefore justifying it not even carrying a spare wheel). What isn’t mentioned is the Foxhound’s composite armour, the primary reason for its £1-million price tag. The British army had conducted extensive tests of composite armour in the 1970s, concluding that it was a nice idea but too expensive to justify using. Another issue with composite armour is that once damaged it loses it structural strength, i.e. it might stop the first bullet fired at it but not the second, third, etcetera. That structural integrity issue also means modifications are difficult, such as adding an anti-drone / anti-rocket-propelled-grenade cage to them.

Despite being signed in to service in September 2012, I don’t believe the Foxhound was ever used in its intended role in Afghanistan as a desert patrol vehicle because in extreme temperatures and demanding driving conditions (combat) it did breakdown in hot weather (as it was still doing in 2017 Iraq). It was able to operate on the tarmac roads of Kabul though and the Foxhound was soon dubbed ‘Kabul’s taxi service’ for diplomats and the like to travel the city in. But even that role was rescinded when it simply became too dangerous for the occupying forces to travel by road in the city. The Foxhound’s composite armour did protect the vehicle’s occupants from minor IED blasts, but driving on public roads in a busy capitol city meant civilians in the area were killed and injured by the Taliban’s attacks on coalition forces.

Foxhound Procurement History

Private Jonathan Kitulagoda was the first British combat fatality* in Afghanistan, a 23-year-old Territorial Army volunteer. He was sent out to patrol Kabul on 28 January 2004 in a completely unarmoured Land Rover to ‘test-the-water’ for a command who really had no idea of the threats they faced. Four other soldiers were wounded in the attack. A Taliban suicide bomber on foot got as close as possible to the Land Rover before detonating his explosives. Initial BBC reports said the attacker was believed to be a British citizen of Algerian descent. Private Kitulagoda’s father and the coroner were both scathing of the British command, but finding their exact reaction is difficult due to government censorship and media paywalls. That was the moment commanders should’ve issued an Urgent-Operational-Requirement order for suitable vehicles which were available, such as the Turkish built Otokar Cobra. The Cobra had been in service since 1997 and the unit price in 2004 was approximately £200,000 – a fifth of the price of the non-taskworthy Foxhound that was delivered in 2012. But penny-pinching and the shameless profiteering motives of the British government and command prevented that.
*Of the first three British military deaths in Afghanistan prior to Private Kitulagoda being killed by enemy action, one was from friendly-fire ('accidentally' shot by another British soldier) and the other two were a drunken murder / suicide.

28 January 2004: Private Kitulagoda & the remains of the soft-skinned Land Rover he was sent out to 'test-the-waters' in Kabul

The British army did have *slightly* better armoured Land Rovers in 2004 that could have been used in Kabul, but the British government wouldn’t let them be deployed because they were so scared of insurrection in another theatre of conflict closer to home – Belfast in Ireland. When those vehicles, the Snatch Land Rovers, were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan they were quickly labelled by the soldiers on the ground as ‘mobile coffins’. British commanders also tried two other ludicrous options. First, they tried to use the Panther command and liaison vehicle, but after adding additional armour and a weapon system on top they were unworkable, sinking in soft sand and in danger of toppling over. The entire fleet of 395 Panthers were sold off in 2018. Next and most desperately they deployed the non-combat logistics Pinzgauer vehicle after strapping random pieces of armour to it, adding a weapon system and renaming it the Vector. As well as being woefully under protected, the additional weight caused the Vector’s suspension and wheel hubs to fail. It was soon withdrawn from service but not before it had been used in 2006 to escort the Taliban cattle trucks that evacuated beleaguered British soldiers from Musa Qala, as can be seen in the Heroes of Helmand - The British Army's Greatest Escape documentary. Those soldiers were heroes, legends in my eyes (as could be said of the Taliban fighters they faced and certainly of the Afghan elders who acted as peace makers), but so appallingly equipped and led that it was the Afghan village elders who had to help negotiate their exit from the Platoon House in the centre of Musa Qala. After months of siege and fighting for their lives, they eventually exited Musa Qala in cattle trucks *driven by Taliban fighters*.

13 October 2006: British soldiers travelling in cattle trucks with Taliban drivers, escorted by Special Forces in the Pinzgauer / Vector

The Military Industrial Complex

Military – The Foxhound over heating and breaking down was known by every member of the Light Vehicles platoon in 2012 Camp Bastion, but no one spoke out because they knew it’d end their career. That effective complicity went to the highest British commanders in Camp Bastion, who setup the staged patrol on 11 September 2012 for the defence secretary to watch. How much further up the chain of command did it go? I can’t say for sure, but it was common knowledge on anonymous internet military chat forums from 2013 onwards, where more details like the £10,000 cost of the bonnet were shared, and that to realign the Foxhound’s wheel hubs, normally a local workshop job, the vehicle had to be returned to the manufacturer. To convey that in civilian terms, it’d be like having to return your car to the assembly plant every time you got a flat tire. So it seems virtually impossible that the most senior commanders up to the Chief of the Defence Staff were blind to the problem. People who most certainly knew were the soldiers on the frontline – in Afghanistan it meant that soldiers in the most remote areas were left to walk between bases when they should have had a functioning LPPV to use. I can cite one example where a nineteen year old soldier on his first deployment and walking point (at the front of the foot patrol) received fatal injuries from an IED blast; the only reason they were out between bases was to fetch batteries for night vision equipment from a neighbouring base because their own was so badly supplied. And clearly the soldiers in Iraq knew the Foxhound was ‘Trucking Useless’, describing the vehicle as “absolutely shit”. It was one of those soldiers, a senior non-commissioned officer nearing retirement, who eventually blew the whistle in 2017. How many other soldiers were killed or maimed because of this corruption? I’ve no idea but would estimate it’s in the hundreds. And then there was the effect on the mission – the lack of a suitable British LPPV undoubtedly gave the Taliban another huge advantage over us.

Industrial – The Foxhound civilian technicians attached to the Light Vehicles platoon in Camp Bastion certainly knew of the overheating / breaking down fault and appeared so ashamed they rarely left their air-conditioned cabin. Why didn’t they speak out? Because like everyone else they knew it wouldn’t change anything other than their own career prospects. Did Force Protection Europe and General Dynamics management know about the problem? I’d say without doubt that they knew, but the reason for their silence was shameless profiteering, not giving a ‘care’ about the frontline soldiers so long as they got their cut of the industrial scale corruption. And when they can continue selling spare parts like bonnets for £10,000, they’re unlikely to ever come clean until put under Oath in a court of law.

Complex – This, as the name suggest, is very complex. I’ve said throughout this report that General Dynamics are responsible, but it is in fact a subsidiary of the American company, General Dynamics Land Systems. How does that differ from General Dynamics UK who gave Sir Andrew Cahn his non-executive directorship in 2012? I’ve no idea, it’s all too complex for me to begin investigating but I hope someone will. The British factory where the Foxhounds were built was supposed to create five-hundred-and-fifty skilled jobs in a politically marginal constituency which is why the government’s Trade and Industry department may have given them government funding and fixed the UOR selection process – to secure votes in the next election. The last informal report I heard is the Foxhound factory is struggling to support fifty employees. Was defence secretary Philip Hammond aware of the corruption he oversaw when he kept ordering more Foxhounds? Again, I can’t say for sure, but I hope one day he’ll be made to answer for himself, under Oath in a court of law.