Human Shields and Illegal Orders - British Tactics in Helmand
by Anthony C Heaford --- @mancunianquiet on twitter
DRAFT
My photos below from summer 2012 Afghanistan show a couple of the issues British soldiers faced in Helmand, and our tactical responses. After an Improvised Explosive Device had split our convoy in two on July 06, and faced with a potential IED in a culvert in front of us, our Afghan allies forced civilians to stand by the culvert as a human shield until our convoy had passed by. And, when faced with stone throwing and equipment stealing children, the British army's tactic (developed over decades of global counter insurgency battles) was to tell the top-covers to throw stones back. During one patrol briefing we were instructed to fire mini-flares (incendiary munitions) so they 'bounce off the floor next to them' , and to threaten them with loaded pistols if the mini-flares didn't scare them. I stopped the thefts and stone throwing multiple times by taking the miscreant's photo.
A Human Shield protects our NATO convoy from a potential IED in the culvert, July 6 2012
Children stone our patrol in Nadi-Ali district; the motorbike in the distance is the local police
Children stop stoning us after they see my camera, scared of a report to the local police
The use of a civilian Human Shield to protect a NATO convoy from a possible IED is clearly a War Crime, but responsibility is difficult to attribute. The British commander didn't place them there, but he didn't stop their use as a Human Shield either. I struggle to blame the Afghan security forces - why would they risk their lives when due to their commander's corruption they were 40% undermanned (ghost soldiers), short of kit and often unpaid. Trying to hold an Afghan officer to account would be pointless; if we want to stop such practices then accountability should be with British and NATO commanders - the Generals and Government Ministers under whose command this happened. If they negligently place ill equipped / trained soldiers in harms way, as happened all over Helmand, then they should be held fully accountable for the consequences.
The escalation of force orders against children were definitely stupid and the offensive use of incendiary munitions is certainly a War Crime too, although I only heard that order once and never saw it carried out. The stupidity of the return-stone throwing order was clear to me the moment I was told during preparations of my first top-cover duty. My initial reaction was disbelief, asking if they were serious, and my second was to ask if I could order a catapult off Amazon (yes, Amazon delivered FOC to Camp Bastion) to use. My reasoning being if that was our best defence then I wanted to be well armed, plus we'd been told about a Taliban sniper who bypassed our body armour by shooting soldiers in the arm pit when they lifted their arm to cock their weapon. Exposing myself from the cuplola with an exposed arm pit as I prepared to stone a child seemed an unreasonable risk to me. I didn't get the catapult but I was given a bag of stones to take with me on that first June 21, 2012 patrol, called Operation Mubarez, a fourteen hour round trip to Forward Operating Base Shawqat in Nadi-Ali.
There were three sets of stone-thrower children waiting for us on our return journey from Nadi-Ali, all in place along the canal road they predicted we'd drive back on. Two groups consisted of two young stone throwers, one older supervisor, and a very young girl acting as a look out (both times in a bright red clothes). I didn't get a clear look at the first group as they were scattered by Afghan Local Police on motorbikes, shown approaching in the right-hand photo. Due to poor communications (our personnel role radios weren't used) I didn't know who the men with guns rapidly approaching our patrol from behind were and that was the only time I prepared to fire-in-anger during my tour, ever in fact, and it was at Afghan local police coming to our aid. Gripping the machinegun, I ducked down to my driver before opening fire, telling him what I'd seen but was soon corrected. They'd been forewarned of the ALP's approach over the vehicle radio but hadn't bothered to tell me - a first-time top-cover test of my alertness I suspect. I managed to get back in the cupola with my camera in time to get the photo, showing my reactions were spot on. I was as quick to shoot a photo as I was ready to shoot two men I didn't know with a 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Gun.
The second set of stone throwers was on the far side of the canal and as soon as they saw me take their photo they stopped and drifted away. It appeared I'd discovered an effective tactic on my very first patrol that had apparently evaded the British army's knowledge despite decades of counter insurgency practice. I tested my tactic on the third set of stone throwers and the reaction was instant, the nearest boy hiding a stone under his arm as soon as he saw my camera.
I nearly shot these Afghan Local Police who were coming to stop the children throwing stones
Children throw stones at our vehicles from the far side of the canal
Children stop stoning our patrol after they see me take their photo. I don't know if the girl in red was coincidental or a distraction / look-out
The boy in white hides a stone under his arm as soon as he sees my camera. A girl dressed in bright red again is visible in the distance

On Friday 6th July 2012 I was one of the last British soldiers to pass over a Taliban Improvised Explosive Device (IED) before it exploded. We were driving west on Highway-One in Helmand Province, Afghanistan and the IED was hidden in a drainage culvert under the road. It exploded after we had passed over it but before the next vehicle of our Combat Logistic Patrol (CLP) had reached it.
No one was injured by the explosion but it did block the Highway and split-up our convoy. We continued back to Camp Bastion in time for tea while the vehicles behind us had to wait for engineers to clear a new route. There will also have been a panic amongst our commanders - if the Taliban had placed an IED there, how did we know there wasn’t another IED in the next culvert? Responsibility for securing Highway-One lay with the Afghan National Army (ANA). We'd built a series a forts that overlooked the road and we depended upon these ANA outposts to monitor long stretches of vulnerable road.
As reports of the IED explosion were communicated forward the ANA commanders of the forts in front of us will have been instructed to check and secure the culverts before we reached them. This was a very unenviable task for anyone, but especially so for appallingly led, poorly equipped and often unpaid Afghan soldiers. Their solution was very simple - they stopped passing civilian traffic, taking passengers off buses and keys from vehicle's before making those civilians stand besides the culverts until all the NATO vehicles had passed-by safely.
Afghan Reports Page