9/11 Flow Chart

By Anthony C Heaford, 11 May 2020

This original report is based on my first-hand knowledge of exactly where, when and how the 9/11 plot began, combined with my speculation (based on documented facts) of how the plot evolved.

work in progress

September 1997

9/11 was unwittingly inspired by a travelling British civilian service technician (me, Anthony Heaford) during a six day business trip to Yemen in September 1997. The printing company I was visiting was in fact a front company for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s terrorist cell, funded and facilitated by a multi-billion dollar, privately owned global conglomerate of businesses called the Hayel Saeed Anam Group (HSAG).

The Pakistani employees at the al Qaeda front company had asked me about travel in the USA and specifically about visiting New York; I gave them a travel warning that the same group who bombed the World Trade Centre in 1993 would try again, but next time they would use hijacked civilian airliners as kamikaze piloted missiles. My travel warning inspired Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's terrorist cell to carry out such an attack. From that point on the plot had three elements, managed by three seperate groups:

1. The hijacker pilots: this central tactical element of the plot focused on a feasability study by the Hamburg Cell in Germany. They'd immediately been assigned the role of pilots in the attacks, as indicated by Jareed’s switch from dentistry studies to an aeronautical engineering in Hamburg in September 1997. Command of this cell had been passed to Mohammed Atta via Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a Yemeni national related to Yousef, my dinner companion in Yemen on 25 September 1997 when we discussed my travel warning predicting a 9/11 style attack in detail.

2. The muscle hijackers: comprising fifteen ideologically devoted Saudi nationals this group was assembled, selected and trained in Yemen at the base besides Al Qa’idah town. I was taken to that base by the general manager of the HSAG for an unscheduled meeting on 26 September 1997, the morning after my dinner meeting with Yousef. They had intended to question me about my prediction of a 9/11 style attack, just as Yousef had the night before, but focusing on the ‘inspiration’ behind my prediction rather than the technical or logistical elements I’d discussed with Yousef. This meeting was cut short because I deliberately acted obtusely before any introductions had been made. I did that because of my impression that I had effectively been kidnapped, taken against my will to a meeting with unidentified people in a secluded and clandestine location. This muscle hijacker hypothesis is supported by the first 9/11 linked visa applications being made in Saudi by the muscle hijackers just six weeks after my visit to the base besides al Qa’idah town.

3. The masterminds: management of the strategic ambitions of the plot was decided by the most senior of people such as Saeed Alrobaidi of the HSAG (known as “the Chief”), the career Afghan jihadi leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (known as “the Professor”), and their protege Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (known as “the Engineer”). Whilst the pilot and muscle hijackers planned the attacks in Yemen and Germany, the masterminds plotted how to place blame on both Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. The Taliban were Sayyaf’s enemy and the obstruction to his taking control of Afghanistan, so placing blame on them would ensure their rule was toppled and replaced by the more extreme Wahhabi ideology of Saudi funded Sayyaf. Blaming Osama bin Laden would remove a thorn from the Saudi dynasty’s side as he was a great threat to their Western dominated rule on the Arabian peninsular.

December 1997 to March 1998

In this period I had four further meetings that I now suspect were connected to my sharing my 9/11 style attack prediction in Yemen. 

Despite having been moved from international service to a UK based sales role by my employer I was sent on three overseas installation visits, apparently after the customers had specifically requested I attend their factories. Those three overseas visit were to Dubai, Jakarta and Manila - all al Qaeda hotspots.

The fourth meeting in March 1998 was in London, when again I was specifically requested by a customer to attend their factory. I now believe the man I met there, a Mr Jones, was connected to British security services - the SIS - Britain's Secret Intelligence Service. Mr Jones certainly had the appearance and demeanour of ‘a man in a grey suit’ - an idiom for the businesspersons, politicians, or government officials who make important decisions behind the scenes but who are unseen and unknown by the public.

Although neither my 9/11 attack prediction or my visit to Yemen were discussed at any of those meetings, the circumstances and context of each gives me cause to believe that each one was intended as an assessment of me and my inclinations. They were possibly also intended to ensure that I was not revealling my attack prediction or bizarre experiences in Yemen to anyone else - i.e. they were security vetting me and the 9/11 plot that I had unwittingly inspired.

Late 1999

It took two years from initiation for the plot to become a plan: the Hamburg Cell had researched the logistical element and confirmed that it was a feasible operation. The muscle hijackers had prepared and committed themselves to their part in the attacks and the masterminds had determined their stratigic aims - to falsely lay blame on the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.

@mancunianquiet