

The Hamburg Cell

by Anthony C Heaford - 16 March 2019

Mohammed Atta

Born in 1968 Egypt
Hijacker/pilot of Flt 11
Moved to Germany as an exchange student in 1992
He travelled abroad with Ramzi bin al-Shibh in late 1997. The Hamburg Cell formed on their return



Ramzi bin al-Shibh

Born in 1972 Yemen,
Guantanamo Detainee
The original 20th hijacker but unable to get a US visa
A 'forever prisoner' at Guantanamo accused of being a key 9/11 facilitator
Travelled between Yemen & Germany in 1997

Ziad Jarrah

Born in 1975 Lebanon
Hijacker/pilot of Flt 93
Lived in Yemen in 1995, moved to Germany in 1996 to study dentistry in Greifswald. Switched to aircraft engineering in Hamburg in Sept 1997



Marwan al-Shehhi

Born in 1978 UAE
Hijacker/pilot of Flt 175
Moved to Germany in 1996 on a UAE military scholarship at Bonn Uni
Moved to Hamburg in early 1998, switching his studies to ship building

The 9/11 Hamburg Cell

The core members of the 9/11 attack plot were four men of various nationalities who all resided in Hamburg, Germany from about September 1997. Three of those men went on to be pilots in the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The fourth core member, Ramzi Bin-al-Shibh, was unable to get a US visa and so was unable to participate in the attacks. He was arrested exactly one year after the attacks and is now imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay prison. Those four core members were:

Mohamed Atta, the Egyptian born hijacker-pilot of American Airlines Flight 11
Marwan al Shehhi, the UAE born hijacker-pilot of United Airlines Flight 175
Ziad Jarrah, the Lebanese born hijacker-pilot of United Airlines Flight 93
Ramzi bin-al-Shibh, the Yemeni born "key facilitator for the September 11 attacks"

There's plenty of evidence that these four men were already radicalised by September 1997, and that they were already preparing for participation in what they thought to be a 'Holy War' or Jihad against the USA. This is how the CIA presents the Hamburg Cell's initial recruitment to that cause: a random conversation on a train journey in 1999, less than 2-years before the attacks.

The CIA assert that it was a conversation trigger by the fact they "*were Arabs with beards*":
9/11 Commission Report (Page 165):

Going to Afghanistan

The available evidence indicates that in 1999, Atta, Binalshibh, Shehhi, and Jarrah decided to fight in Chechnya against the Russians. According to Binalshibh, a chance meeting on a train in Germany caused the group to travel to Afghanistan instead. An individual named Khalid al Masri approached Binalshibh and Shehhi (because they were Arabs with beards, Binalshibh thinks) and struck up a conversation about jihad in Chechnya. When they later called Masri and expressed interest in going to Chechnya, he told them to contact Abu Musab in Duisburg, Germany. Abu Musab turned out to be Mohamedou Ould Slahi, a significant al Qaeda operative who, even then, was well known to U.S. and German intelligence, though neither government apparently knew he was operating in Germany in late 1999. When telephoned by Binalshibh and Shehhi, Slahi reportedly invited these promising recruits to come see him in Duisburg.⁸⁹

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This next section of the 9/11 Commission Report, shown below, really does beggar belief. It asserts that within a few months of having a random conversation on a train in Germany, they had been introduced to [Osama bin-Laden](#) and [Mohammed Atef](#), *al Qaeda*'s two most senior commanders. It also asserts that from a global organisation that'd been established for 10-years, *al Qaeda* chose four new and "aspiring jihadists" to execute the greatest terrorist attack in history, based principally on their "familiarity with life in the West".

5.3 THE HAMBURG CONTINGENT

Although Bin Ladin, Atef, and KSM initially contemplated using established *al Qaeda* members to execute the planes operation, the late 1999 arrival in Kandahar of four aspiring jihadists from Germany suddenly presented a more attractive alternative. The Hamburg group shared the anti-U.S. fervor of the other candidates for the operation, but added the enormous advantages of fluency in English and familiarity with life in the West, based on years that each member of the group had spent living in Germany. Not surprisingly, Mohamed Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah would all become key players in the 9/11 conspiracy.

What the 9/11 Commission asserts next takes their report from 'begging belief' and in to the realms of fairy-tales. It claims that within days of arriving in Afghanistan, they had met Osama bin-Laden and sworn an oath of loyalty to *al Qaeda*. It is then claimed that the *al Qaeda* second in command, Mohammed Atef, actually gave them a list of the 9/11 targets as their first mission. Even the commission struggles with this story line but it is still what they went along with and printed in their [final report, on page 166](#):

The commission goes on to claim that the four 'aspiring jihadis' were sent for 'special forces training' before being given bundles of cash and told to return to Germany to commence with their assigned mission. Again according to the 9/11 commission, the three Hamburg Cell members who were able to gain visas travelled to the US on their suicide mission within six-months of first joining *al Qaeda* in December 1999.

a martyrdom operation.⁹¹

Atta, Jarrah, and Binalshibh then met with Atef, who told them they were about to undertake a highly secret mission. As Binalshibh tells it, Atef instructed the three to return to Germany and enroll in flight training. Atta—whom Bin Ladin chose to lead the group—met with Bin Ladin several times to receive additional instructions, including a preliminary list of approved targets: the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the U.S. Capitol.⁹² The new recruits also learned that an individual named Rabia al Makki (Nawaf al Hazmi) would be part of the operation.⁹³

In retrospect, the speed with which Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh became core members of the 9/11 plot—with Atta designated its operational leader—is remarkable. They had not yet met with KSM when all this occurred. It is clear, then, that Bin Ladin and Atef were very much in charge of the operation. That these candidates were selected so quickly—before comprehensive testing in the training camps or in operations—demonstrates that Bin Ladin and Atef probably already understood the deficiencies of their initial team, Hazmi and Mihdhar. The new recruits from Germany possessed an ideal com-

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My Theory

In Sept 1997 I unwittingly initiated the 9/11 plot during a 6-day business trip to Yemen. My customer was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's terrorist cell's front company.

| | | | | |
|---|--|--|---|---|
| Arr. Yemen Sunday 20th  16 | Dinner with Yousef 25th  22 | Friday 26th Sept  23 |  24 | |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Mohamed A. Salem General Manager & the US embassy's trading contact | "The Chief" Saeed Alrobaidi Managing Director OMANI | Anthony C Heaford A visiting service technician BRITISH | "The Engineer" Khalid Sheikh Mohammed PAKISTANI | "Dino" Ahmed al-Darbi Al Qaeda's mechanic Convicted & released SAUDI NATIONAL |

The 9/11 plot was instigated on the 26 September 1997, the morning after my dinner conversations with Yousef. An initial feasibility study was immediately assigned to future Hamburg Cell leader Mohammed Atta. This was done via the Yemeni Hamburg Cell member Ramzi bin-al-Shibh.

25 September 1997 - Taiz, Yemen



Youssef

Anthony C Heaford


By arrangement of Mr. Saeed of the HSA Group this man came to my hotel and introduced himself as Yousef. We discussed the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing before I spoke about the ease with which a hijacked airplane departing Logan airport could be used as a kamikaze piloted missile to strike the WTC in Manhattan.

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The connection between my meetings in September 1997 and the Hamburg Cell is my dinner companion Youssef. From facial recognition software matches, nationalities and the circumstances of our meeting I have determined Youssef and Ramzi bin-al-Shibh are either brothers or cousins.

My assertion is reinforced when a comparison is made between the two men in my blurred photo from 26th September 1997 and the two al Qaeda members Ahmed al-Darbi and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed:



Youssef my 1997 dinner companion in Yemen



Ramzi bin al-Shibh Guantanamo detainee



Khalid Sheikh Mohammed



"the Engineer"

"Dino"



Ahmed al-Darbi

Further validation of my theory comes from **facts** reported in the 9/11 Commission Report and from the best 9/11 research resource I know of, historycommons.org '[Complete 911 Timeline](#)', as noted and linked below:

ing asylum. While his asylum petition was pending, Binalshibh lived in Hamburg and associated with individuals from several mosques there. In 1997, after his asylum application was denied, Binalshibh went home to Yemen but returned to Germany shortly thereafter under his true name, this time registering as a student in Hamburg. Binalshibh continually had academic problems, failing tests and cutting classes; he was expelled from one school in September 1998.⁶⁷

First [Ramzi bin-al-Shibh](#) returns to Germany after a visit to Yemen, sometime in late 1997, settling in Hamburg ([Page 161](#)).

increasingly pronounced. According to Binalshibh, as early as 1995 Atta sought to organize a Muslim student association in Hamburg. In the fall of 1997, he joined a working group at the Quds mosque in Hamburg, a group designed to bridge the gap between Muslims and Christians. Atta proved a poor bridge, however, because of his abrasive and increasingly dogmatic personality. But

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About the same time cell leader [Mohamed Atta](#) appears to either attempt one last reconciliation with those he is thinking of attacking (Western civilians and society), or is simply researching and preparing himself for the proposed attacks ([Page 160](#)).

having academic difficulties at this time, [Shehhi](#) appeared to become more extreme in the practice of his faith; for example, he specifically avoided restaurants that cooked with or served alcohol. In [late 1997](#), he applied for permission to complete his course work in [Hamburg](#), a request apparently motivated by his desire to join [Atta](#) and [Binalshibh](#). Just how and when the three of them first met remains unclear, although they seemed to know each other already

And again in the correct time-frame, late 1997, [Marwan al Shehhi](#) applies to move to Hamburg to join the other cell members ([Page 162](#))

life and a desire not to leave the world “in a natural way.”⁷⁷

In [September 1997](#), [Jarrah](#) abruptly switched his intended course of study from [dentistry](#) to [aircraft engineering](#)—at the Technical University of [Hamburg-Harburg](#). His motivation for this decision remains unclear. The rationale he expressed to Senguen—that he had been interested in aviation

Possibly most compellingly, [Ziad Jarrah](#) switches studies from dentistry in Greifswald (in northeastern Germany) to aircraft engineering in Hamburg ([Page 163](#)). Establishing the date of this course change request would be very 'interesting'.

[November 2, 1997-June 20, 2001: Hijackers Obtain US Visas](#)

The 19 hijackers apply and receive a total of 23 visas at five different posts from [November 1997](#) through [June 2001](#). [Hani Hanjour](#), [Khalid Almihdhar](#), [Saeed Alghamdi](#) and [Ahmed Alnami](#), Saudi citizens, apply twice at [Jeddah](#). Only [Hanjour](#) applies for a student visa, others for tourist/business visa. [UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 10/21/2002 [A](#)]; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 7-45 [A](#)]

From the historycommons website we can see the [first hijacker visa applications](#) connected to the 9/11 plot are made just 5-weeks after my meeting with Youssef in Yemen.

[Late 1997-Early 1998: 9/11 Hijacker Atta Disappears from Germany for Months; He Possibly Trains in Afghanistan with Bin Al-Shibh](#)



Future 9/11 hijacker [Mohamed Atta](#) leaves Hamburg for some time in late 1997 and early 1998, and he may go to militant training camps in Afghanistan, possibly with hijacker associate [Ramzi bin al-Shibh](#). When [Atta](#) returns in the spring of 1998 he tells his roommate that he has been on another pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca, although author [Terry McDermott](#) will later note,

Historycommons reports that [Mohamed Atta & Ramzi bi-al-Shibh](#) 'disappear' from Germany for some months in late 1997. I would suggest they both visited the same training [camp near al Qidah town in Yemen that I visited in September 1997](#).


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Early 1998: CIA Ignores Ex-Agent's Warning KSM Is 'Going to Hijack Some Planes,' Visiting Germany



In December 1997, former CIA agent Robert Baer, newly retired from the CIA and working as a terrorism consultant, meets Hamad bin Jassim bin Hamad al Thani, who was Qatar's minister of the economy and chief of police until he was deposed and exiled the year before, and whom he calls the "black prince." Al Thani tells Baer that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) was being sheltered by then Qatari Interior Minister Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani in 1996 (see January-May 1996). However, the black prince knows other details, based on what Qatari police and intelligence learned when KSM was in the country. He says that KSM is chief of al-Qaeda's terrorist operations (see Early 1998). KSM was leading an al-Qaeda cell in Qatar together with Mohammed Shawqui Islambouli, the brother of the Egyptian who had killed Anwar Sadat. They also were linked to bomber Ramzi Yousef. But what worries the black prince is that KSM and Islambouli are experts in hijacking commercial planes. He tells Baer that KSM "is going to hijack some planes." Further, he says that KSM has moved to the Czech Republic, and has also traveled to Germany to meet bin Laden associates there. In early 1998 Baer sends this information to a friend in the CIA Counterterrorist Center, who forwards the information to his superiors. Baer doesn't hear back from the CIA. He says, "There was no interest." [BAER, 2002, PP. 270-71; VANITY FAIR, 2/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/30/2002; BAER, 2003, PP. 190-198] **Later in 1998, President Clinton will**



Robert Baer. [Source: Publicity photo]

Lastly from historycommons, this report that says within months of when I think the 9/11 plot was instigated by me in Yemen, a former CIA agent is told by one of the most valid sources possible exactly what was going on. A Qatari Prince & former head of Qatar's police force tells Robert Baer that "KSM is going to hijack some planes". Former agent Baer passes this warning back to the CIA but recalls "*there was no interest*".

I gave my last and most specific warning of the impending attacks when I was in New York in December 1997; clearly that and other warnings I gave were ignored. I've read about so many other warnings given by people far more qualified than myself being ignored too. And so I find it incredible that the CIA appears to have got away with their assertion that the Hamburg Cell had no connection to 9/11 until 1999, when a man on a train decided to speak to them, because "*they were Arabs with beards*".

I pray every day that justice will prevail and those responsible for the previous and current investigatory coverups of who is really most guilty for planning the murder of 2,976 people on 9/11. I also hope justice is dealt to those who are most responsible for not stopping the attacks before they happened.

9/11 was 100% preventable and **I know people CHOOSE not to stop it**, mostly for their own profit.